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Note
Grade "A" Certified:
The First Amendment Significance of Grading by
Public University Professors
Jennifer L.M. Jacobs*
After twenty-eight years of teaching at a public university,
Robert Brown, a tenured professor, was dismissed.' Brown
claimed he was suspended for refusing to change a student's
grade from an "F" to an "Incomplete" at the request of the
university president and was then fired for criticizing the
president. 2 He alleged that this violated his right to free
speech.3 Brown v. Armenti raises the issue confronted by
several circuit courts over the past two decades: whether the
grades that professors give their students are constitutionally
protected speech under the First Amendment. 4
This Note focuses on the lack of uniformity in the circuit
courts' jurisprudential approaches to this issue. Which First
Amendment doctrines apply, and how they apply, are unclear.
This Note first agrees with the circuit courts that grades are
ultimately the speech of the university rather than the
professor. This is supported not only by First Amendment case
law, but also by policy rationales, which possess heightened
persuasiveness and relevance because of the nebulous nature of
the law of academic freedom. Beyond that initial
determination, however, this Note addresses the avenues the
courts should use to analyze professors' First Amendment
claims regarding the grades they assign students.
* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1998,
Coe College. I thank Professor Dan Farber and Rebecca Bernhard for their
helpful comments on this Note; my mother Elizabeth Cody and my
grandmother Edith Lee for teaching me to love reading; and Matthew Jacobs
for walking through life with me.
1. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 73.
4. Id.
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Part I of this Note introduces the relevant Supreme Court
jurisprudence: the development of academic freedom; the public
concern test; and the compelled speech doctrine. Part II
articulates the crucial policy considerations supporting the
circuit courts' conclusion that grades are the speech of the
university. Part III details the different approaches taken by
the circuit courts in dealing with the First Amendment
implications of the grades a professor gives, focusing on their
decisions of whether to use the public concern test and
compelled speech doctrine. Finally, Part IV proposes which of
these First Amendment doctrines a court should consider when
presented with a factual situation like that in Brown v.
Armenti.
This Note concludes that grades should be treated as the
speech of the university rather than the individual professor.
Current jurisprudence and scholarship in this area fail to
adequately articulate and consider the important interests of
students and overrate those of professors. Professors' academic
freedom need not be broadened to encompass the grades they
assign students. This Note argues that application of the
public concern' test is nonsensical in this context, but the
compelled speech doctrine must be considered in cases where a
professor and the administration disagree about a grade. This
Note also explains the manner in which a student's transcript
can reflect a professor's disagreement with the ultimate grade
given by the university in order to avoid compelling the
professor to speak in a certain manner. This proposed
approach would better address the realities of the university
context, balance the interests of the university, the professor,
and the student, and honor the vision of academic freedom
expressed by the Supreme Court.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND GRADING
Three areas of First Amendment case law particularly
pertain to the issue of professors' speech interest in the grades
they give students-decisions addressing academic freedom,
the public concern test, and the compelled speech doctrine.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECOGNITION OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
To understand the circuit courts' treatment of professors'
speech interest in grades, it is first important to grasp the
underpinnings of academic freedom. Although the doctrine was
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introduced in cases dealing with state restrictions on
professors' political views,5 the Supreme Court's definition of
academic freedom has evolved to embrace universities' ability
to control their educational missions.
The Supreme Court first recognized academic freedom in
the 1950s.6 In Adler v. Board of Education, Justice Douglas, in
his dissent, spoke of the contested statute's impact on academic
freedom.7 He wrote, "What happens under this law is typical of
what happens in a police state .... A pall is cast over the
classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that
environment." 8 Justice Douglas referred to a broad, nebulous
freedom-presaging continual difficulty in defining the
freedom's bounds.
Academic freedom was first mentioned by the Supreme
Court in a majority opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.9
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren extolled the
virtues of academic freedom. 10 He observed,
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation."
The Court found academic freedom entangled in notions of
political freedom.' 2 Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sweezy,
5. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489-92 (1952) (determining
the constitutionality of New York's Feinberg Law, which prohibited
employment of any member of an organization that supported overthrowing
the government with forceful, violent, or illegal means in the public schools),
overruled by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385
U.S. 589 (1967).
6. Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and
Universities: 0 Say, Does That Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet
Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3 (1993). The first American definition of
academic freedom came from the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) in its 1915 Declaration of Principles. Linda S. Lovely,
Comment, Beyond "The Freedom to Do Good and Not to Teach Evil":
Professors' Academic Freedom Rights in Classrooms of Public Higher
Education, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 711, 714 (1991); see also AM. ASSOC. OF
UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3-4 (7th ed. 1990)
(providing the AAUP's complete definition of academic freedom).
7. 342 U.S. at 508-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
10. Id. at 249-50.
11. Id. at 250.
12. Id.
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referred to the importance of "the exclusion of governmental
intervention in the intellectual life of a university."1 3 He also
discussed the "four essential freedoms of a university-to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study."14  According to Justice Frankfurter,
academic freedom is enjoyed not only by teachers, but also
inheres in educational institutions. 15
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the
State of New York, 16 the Court "specifically linked academic
freedom to the [F]irst [A]mendment," 17 proclaiming academic
freedom "a special concern of the First Amendment, which does
13. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting THE OPEN
UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10-12 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. Id. at 261-63. Not all scholars have accepted this assertion; the
debate over whether academic freedom is a right that academic institutions as
well as professors possess continues to be debated vigorously. See, e.g.,
Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV.
817, 818 (1983) ("Institutional autonomy and academic freedom are related
but distinct ideas."); Rachel E. Fugate, Choppy Waters Are Forecast for
Academic Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 187, 188-95 (1998)
(acknowledging only a professor's right to academic freedom); Hiers, supra
note 6, at 55 ("The notion that academic institutions are somehow endowed
with an 'academic freedom' to restrict or punish the exercise of academic
freedom by their faculty is aberrant."); Walter P. Metzger, Profession and
Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1265, 1310-22 (1988) (suggesting that although the Supreme Court has
not given the concept of institutional academic freedom a strong root in the
Constitution, it has recognized the right in several cases dealing with
academic freedom); Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Professorial Academic
Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third "Essential Freedom", 45 STAN. L. REV.
1835, 1837 (1993) ("[Academic freedom] protects quite expansively the
scholarly enterprise from outside interference . . . . but only grants limited
protection to professors' intramural speech or classroom activities against
institutional interests."); Harry F. Tepker, Jr. & Joseph Harroz, Jr., On
Balancing Scales, Kaleidoscopes, and the Blurred Limits of Academic
Freedom, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (describing the freedom a professor has
as "academic freedom" and the rights of the university as "institutional
academic autonomy"); Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32
LOY. L. REV. 831, 834, 848, 851 (1987) (characterizing academic freedom as
having three faces: personal autonomy, government expression, and
institutional authority); David M. Dumas et al., Comment, Parate v. Isibor:
Resolving the Conflict Between the Academic Freedom of the University and the
Academic Freedom of University Professors, 16 J.C. & U.L. 713, 713-23 (1990)
(stating without argument that both the university professor and the academic
institution possess a right to academic freedom).
16. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
17. Lovely, supra note 6, at 719.
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not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom." 18 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted,
"[olur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned." 19 The difficulties of defining
academic freedom and its bounds can be attributed at least in
part to the reverential distance with which opinions such as
this have treated it.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a
majority of the Court for the first time indicated that academic
freedom applies not only to professors, but also to universities
themselves. 20 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell stated,
"[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern
of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body."21  Moreover, he reemphasized the nation's
commitment to protecting the four academic freedoms
enunciated in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sweezy. 22
The Court confirmed that universities themselves have an
interest in academic freedom in Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing.23 In a footnote, Justice Stevens stated for
the majority, "[a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the
independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers
and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on
autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself."24 While
establishing that the university possesses some form of
academic freedom itself, Justice Stevens also acknowledged the
18. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
19. Id.
20. See 438 U.S. 265, 269-70 (1978).
21. Id. at 312.
22. Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (listing the four
freedoms).
23. 474 U.S. 214 (1985). Justice Frankfurter referred to the interest in a
concurring opinion in Sweezy. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); cf. Julius G. Getman & Jacqueline W. Mintz, Foreword: Academic
Freedom in a Changing Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1988) (arguing
that at the core of academic freedom is "the right of faculty members to seek,
teach, and write the truth as they see it").
24. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Many pages of legal scholarship have been dedicated to unraveling this
inconsistency. For a discussion of this inconsistency, see the sources cited
supra note 15.
20031 817
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inherent conflict in the notion that both the individual
professor and the institution share the freedom.25
The Supreme Court's decisions that address academic
freedom introduce an important concept: Both professors and
universities possess an interest in academic freedom. While
recognizing that professors must be allowed to engage in the
"uninhibited exchange of ideas,"26 the Court has also indicated
that in order to encourage the free flow of ideas, universities
must be autonomous and allowed to develop educational
missions as they see fit.27
B. USE OF THE PUBLIC CONCERN TEST TO ANALYZE
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES' SPEECH
To analyze free speech issues that arise in the context of
public employment, the Supreme Court has developed the
public concern test. 28 The Supreme Court developed this test in
Pickering v. Board of Education29 and Connick v. Myers30 and
clarified the state interest element of the test in Rankin v.
McPherson.31 Courts have used the public concern test to
analyze issues of academic freedom. 32
In Pickering v. Board of Education, a public school teacher
was dismissed after writing an editorial criticizing the Board of
Education's handling of a bond issue.33 The Court stated that
in analyzing whether a public employee's First Amendment
rights have been violated, it must "arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." 34  Courts must strike a
balance between the interest of the public employer and the
25. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
29. 391 U.S. at 568.
30. 461 U.S. at 146-47.
31. 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
32. See Chris Hoofnagle, Matters of Public Concern and the Public
University Professor, 27 J.C. & U.L. 669, 669 (2001) ("The 'matter of public
concern' test ... is now used to determine the First Amendment value of
professors' expression .. .
33. 391 U.S. at 566.
34. Id. at 568.
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GRADE "A" CERTIFIED
public employee. 35 The Court held that "teachers may [not]
constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the
operation of public schools in which they work."36
Connick v. Myers involved a public employee who was
dismissed after distributing a questionnaire regarding the
internal affairs of her office. 37 The Supreme Court held that
because the employee's speech did not involve a matter of
"political, social, or other concern to the community,"38 her
superior did not violate the First Amendment by firing her.39
The Court noted that public employees speaking on matters of
public concern, on the other hand, are entitled to protection.40
The Court stated, "Whether an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content,
form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
whole record."41 The determination, this suggests, is case-by-
case and not strictly defined. 42
The public concern test was further refined in Rankin v.
McPherson.43 In Rankin, the Court established that the focus
of the state interest element of the Pickering-Connick balancing
test should be the effective operation of the activity in which
the public employer is engaged. 44 The Court observed, "public
employers are employers, concerned with the efficient function
of their operations; review of every personnel decision made by
a public employer could, in the long run, hamper the
performance of public functions."45 The Court noted, however,
that "[v]igilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do
not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not
because it hampers public functions but simply because
superiors disagree with the content of employee's speech."46 In
Rankin, while the Court suggested that public employers must
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. 461 U.S. at 140-41.
38. Id. at 146.
39. Id. at 146-47.
40. Id. at 147.
41. Id. at 147-48.
42. See id.
43. 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 384.
46. Id.
2003]
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not be allowed to quiet their employees' speech simply because
they dislike it, the Court also indicated respect for public
employers' ability to manage their operations and recognized
that personnel decisions factor into that control. 47  In the
context of a dispute between a university and a professor, the
state interest is ensuring that its public university students
receive fair grades.48
Because public university professors are government
employees, if they speak on a matter of public concern, that
speech would be subject to the Pickering-Connick balancing
test. In the context of the grade a professor gives a student, the
issue becomes whether that grade is a statement on a matter of
public concern. As will be discussed in Part III, at least one
circuit court has confused the First Amendment significance of
a professor's criticism of the grading policies of a university
(likely a matter of public concern) with the First Amendment
significance of a grade assigned by a professor with which the
administration disagrees (not a matter of public concern). 49
C. THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
The government's inability to force citizens to speak in a
particular way affects whether universities can require
professors to change students' grades. The Supreme Court
condemned state compulsion of speech in its 1943 decision West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.50 The Court
found a state regulation requiring schoolchildren to salute the
flag to be unconstitutional because saluting the flag was a form
of speech. 51 The Court observed, "To sustain the compulsory
flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which
guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open
to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his
mind."52 The Court established that not speaking receives as
much protection as speaking does. 53
The Court, in Wooley v. Maynard, affirmed the
unconstitutionality of a state compelling the speech of its
47. Id.
48. See Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir. 1992) (defining the
university's interest as ensuring fair grades for its students).
49. See infra Part III.D.
50. 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
51. Id. at 632.
52. Id. at 634.
53. See id.
[Vol 87:813
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citizens.54 In Wooley, Jehovah's Witnesses challenged their
obligation to display New Hampshire license plates reading
"Live Free or Die" as abhorrent to their religious beliefs and in
violation of the First Amendment.5 5 The Court found that the
state could not require its citizens to convey a message with
which they disagreed.5 6 The Court held, "The right to speak
and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of
mind.', 57
The issue of compelled speech has arisen in the context of
public university grades when a professor wishes to refrain
from speaking in a certain manner, unwilling to assign a grade
that he or she does not believe the student has earned. 58 As
such, it is important that refraining from speaking has been
acknowledged as a First Amendment right by the Supreme
Court.
II. BALANCING UNIVERSITY, PROFESSOR, AND
STUDENT INTERESTS IN GRADES
The circuit courts basically agree that grades are the
speech of the university, not the professor.59 Their opinions,
54. 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
55. Id. at 707.
56. Id. at 717.
57. Id. at 714 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943)).
58. See, e.g., Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 1989).
59. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[A] public
university professor does not have a First Amendment right to expression via
the school's grade assignment procedures."); Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888,
891 (7th Cir. 2001) ("No person has a fundamental right to teach
undergraduate engineering classes without following the university's grading
rules."), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 903 (2001); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257
(7th Cir. 1992) ("This Court has recognized the supremacy of the academic
institution in matters of curriculum content. . . '[W]e do not conceive
academic freedom to be a license for uncontrolled expression ... internally
destructive of the proper functioning of the institution.'" (quoting Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972))); Parate, 868 F.2d at 829
("Parate ... has no constitutional interest in the grades which his students
ultimately receive."); Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426
(1st Cir. 1986) (finding that "matters such as... grading policy are core
university concerns"); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547,
553 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that an administration requiring a professor to
assign a certain grade to a student did not "cast a pall of orthodoxy" over
professor's class, and therefore did not violate the First Amendment) (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
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however, do not fully articulate the policy implications
supporting their consensus. This Part raises important policy
arguments that support this conclusion. Because of the
nebulous nature of academic freedom, these policy rationales
provide a necessary anchor to the conclusion that grades are
the speech of the university.
Placing the ultimate control over grades in the hands of the
universities clearly benefits universities, as they are able to
control their academic identity. How this affects professors and
students, however, is less clear and therefore forms the focus of
this section. First, this Part establishes that professors do not
deserve more First Amendment protection than other citizens.
Next, it argues that professors' ability to determine how and
what to teach is only minimally affected by not having the final
say on what grades their students receive. Finally, it finds that
students benefit a great deal from placing grading control in
the hands of the administration rather than professors. These
conclusions support the circuit courts' determination that
universities, rather than individual professors, should possess
control over students' grades.
A. PROFESSORS', FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
INTEREST IN GRADES
Academic freedom holds a "near-sacrosanct" place among
many academics. 60 Scholars writing about academic freedom
tend to favor broad protection for professors. 61 This is not
In reaching this conclusion, the courts relied most heavily on two cases-
Keyishian and Bakke. See Armenti, 247 F.3d at 75 (citing Edwards v. Cal.
Univ. of Penn., 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978))); Keen, 970 F.2d at 257 (citing
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603); Parate, 886 F.2d at 826 (citing Keyishian, 385
U.S. at 603; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312); Lovelace, 793 F.2d at 426 (citing Bakke,
438 U.S. at 312); Hillis, 665 F.2d at 553 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603;
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-14).
Parate goes the farthest, finding that professors have some First
Amendment interest in grading; but even that case concedes that professors
possess no speech interest in the ultimate grade students receive. 868 F.2d at
827, 829.
60. Richard H. Hiers, New Restrictions on Academic Free Speech: Jeffries
v. Harleston II, 22 J.C. & U.L. 217, 218 (1995).
61. See, e.g., Fugate, supra note 15, at 213 ("Academic freedom concerns
professional freedom, enjoyed in a limited, professional capacity, and not
necessarily shared with the public at large."); Olivas, supra note 15, at 1857;
David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1990, at 227, 244; Ailsa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitating the
[Vol 87:813
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surprising, considering that the authors of law review articles
addressing the issue are generally professors themselves, who
clearly possess an important self-interest in maintaining a
broad freedom.62 Professor David M. Rabban argues that
academic freedom gives more protection to professors than the
First Amendment provides for other public employees. 63
Similarly, Professor Matthew W. Finkin argues that
institutional academic freedom, which the Supreme Court
mentioned in Bakke, gives too much protection to a university
at the expense of the academic freedom of its professors.64
In this vein, one suggested way to deal with the treatment
of grades is by insulating professors' grades from judicial,
administrative, or peer review. 65  This broad protection
provides for no evaluation of professors' grading practices,
essentially establishing a complete shield around professors in
how they choose to grade their students. 66  The grade a
particular professor assigns to a student would be deemed
appropriate merely by its issuance from the pen of a member of
the academe. 67 Surely the argument that no one but the actual
professor can fully understand the reasons behind the grades
he or she assigns applies to decisions made by many employees
in many jobs around the world; yet somehow in the vast
majority of employment settings, supervisors manage to
oversee the work of their employees without the benefit of full
Constitutional "Theory" of Academic Freedom: A Search for a Standard
Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 964 (2001) (arguing that
'speech that gives rise to academic freedom rights is presumptively more
deserving of protection [because] academic freedom is not solely an interest of
the professor-employee" but also of the university).
62. In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this Note is a student,
clearly possessing an important self-interest in receiving fair grades.
63. See Rabban, supra note 61, at 244.
64. See Finkin, supra note 15, at 817. But see Mark G. Yudof, Intramural
Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 66 TEX. L. REV.
1351, 1356 (1988) (suggesting that providing extra protection to professors
"lends itself to a kind of unbridled libertarianism for academicians").
65. See Thomas A. Schweitzer, "Academic Challenge" Cases: Should
Judicial Review Extend to Academic Evaluations of Students?, 41 AM. U. L.
REV. 267, 364 (1992) (arguing that "a third party without knowledge or
expertise in the subject matter of the course is generally incapable of assessing
a student's performance on an examination in that course" and suggesting
that "not only an outside jurist but even a colleague of the professor teaching
the same course and using the same textbook is not completely qualified to
evaluate such a student's performance" (emphasis added)).
66. See id.
67. See id.
2003]
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knowledge of the intricacies of every choice made.68 There is
something distasteful about the amount of protection some
professors are willing to provide themselves.
Moreover, academic freedom is not a separate
constitutional right reserved for academics. 69 Rather, it is an
area of law that has developed in the process of dealing with
the wealth of First Amendment issues that arise in the
classroom. 70  There is no constitutional support for the
proposition that professors are entitled to more freedom than
other citizens, 71 and the suggestion that they are raises
questions of equal protection.72
Furthermore, professors' intellectual interest in grades is
not tremendous, especially compared with their intellectual
interest in other areas. 73 Class curriculum, topic, and subject
presentation are all areas in which it is easy to see the
importance of a professor's interest.74 A professor's ability to
determine what and how he or she instructs and researches is
paramount to the notion of academic freedom and to a
professor's ability to define him or herself as a scholar and
teacher. 75 Grades, on the other hand, are evaluations of third
parties and should not play as much of a role in self-
68. Cf. CYNTHIA D. FISHER ET AL., HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 485
(3d ed. 1996) ("In most organizations, subjective ratings of employee
performance are provided by supervisors.").
69. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)
("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right,
long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment." (emphasis
added)); see also Dumas et al., supra note 15, at 717 (noting that the Supreme
Court has not "grant[ed] independent constitutional status to academic
freedom").
70. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
71. U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."); see
also Dumas et al., supra note 15, at 716 (observing that "the United States
Constitution does not specifically mention academic freedom").
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
73. Cf Olivas, supra note 15, at 1836 ("The search for truth requires that
scholars receive the protection of academic freedom in posing new,
controversial, or unpopular ideas in their teaching and research.").
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("The
essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost
self-evident.").
[Vol 87:813
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definition. 76
Proponents of a broader First Amendment right for
professors might argue that although professors do not have a
strong interest in the actual grades themselves, the control a
professor has over grades may affect how he or she chooses to
teach. For example, a professor who requires class
participation from students may take that into account when
determining students' grades, perhaps not allowing students to
earn anything above a "B" if they did not participate in class. If
the administration can raise the grade from a "B" upon request
of the student, one could argue that the university is, in effect,
not allowing the professor to require class participation.
The changing of a grade by the administration, however,
may reflect factors other than a rejection of the professor's
teaching style.77  Moreover, the infrequency with which
administrative grade changes appear to actually occur suggests
that a professor's desire to require class participation will not
be thwarted by the administrative change of one student's
grade.78 Concerns about academic freedom would be presented
if a university administration routinely revised the grades
given by a certain professor as a way of moderating that
professor's teaching techniques, e.g., expressing its disapproval
of requiring class participation by raising the grades of all
students who, because they did not participate in class,
received no higher than a "B," to an "A." This extends beyond
the realm of grades and into the area of autonomy of one's own
teaching style. The professor in that situation has a stronger
academic freedom argument than the professor who disagreed
with the administration over the appropriate grade one student
should receive.
Ideally, grades are objectively accurate representations of
76. Cf John 0. Mudd, Academic Change in Law Schools, 29 GONZ. L.
REV. 29, 43 (1993) ("Examinations are not generally considered as part of the
curriculum, but they do have a significant influence on the learning process.").
77. These alternative factors may not be laudable either. See Press
Release, NCAA, NCAA: Standards Protect Students from Exploitation, (Jan.
8, 1997), http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepage.cgi/miscellaneous/199701080
lms.htm [hereinafter NCAA Press Release] (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (noting
the "possibility of grade inflation and fraud due to a student's athletics
status"). The fact that other bad motivations may be present, however,
suggests that the university may not be trying to control professor's teaching
style but perhaps achieving another questionable goal.
78. See Olivas, supra note 15, at 1840 (noting that "there are few cases
arising from student objections to professorial prerogatives").
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the work a student has done over the duration of the course.79
Viewed as such, it is difficult to see the speech value in them at
all.80 If they are instead a mode of expression for the professor
who gives them, students have little assurance of receiving fair,
accurate grades.
The most practical argument militating against a version
of professorial academic freedom that encompasses the grades
professors give their students is that, simply, they do not need
it. A university has a strong self-interest in hiring top faculty
and establishing, or maintaining, prestige in its field.81 In
order to achieve that, they must respect the views of their
faculty.8 2 Susan Pedersen, Dean of Undergraduate Education
at Harvard University, when responding to a question about
Harvard's apparent grade inflation, explained, "We are
concerned about it. We think it's important that we give grades
that support our pedagogical mission and so we are having a
faculty review and a faculty discussion about this right now."83
Most universities, like Harvard, surely consider the views of
their faculty members integral to the creation of their
pedagogical missions.8 4 Moreover, competition for top-notch
students drives educational institutions to retain academic
credibility. Universities will not be able to attract and retain
excellent students if they do not attract and retain excellent
faculty, which is unlikely to occur if professors believe their
ability to grade fairly is compromised by the university's
79. Cf Robert C. Downs & Nancy Levit, If It Can't Be Lake Woebegone...
A Nationwide Survey of Law School Grading and Grade Normalization
Practices, 65 UMKC L. REv. 819, 822 (1997) (suggesting that universities
should use "a normative structure to help systematize irregularities in what is
now an excessively subjective process").
80. See Keen, 970 F.2d at 257 ("It is difficult to see what matters of public
concern are implicated ... by the 'F' grade he eventually gave her .... ).
81. See Sam Tanenhaus, The Ivy League's Angry Star, VANITY FAIR, June
2002, at 200 (describing the brouhaha that surrounded Afro-American studies
professor Cornel West's recent move from Harvard to Princeton and its impact
on the department, particularly the tension between West and Harvard's
president).
82. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991)
("University officials are undoubtedly aware that quality faculty members will
be hard to attract and retain if they are to be shackled in much of what they
do."); Tanenhaus, supra note 81, at 200; All Things Considered: Dean Susan
Pedersen Talks About Harvard's Grade Inflation (National Public Radio
broadcast, Nov. 21, 2001) [hereinafter All Things Considered], available at
2001 WL 9437361.
83. All Things Considered, supra note 82, available at 2001 WL 9437361.
84. See id.
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practices.8 5 The market of higher education self-regulates
enough that an expanded version of professorial academic
freedom is not only inappropriate given other considerations,
but also unnecessary. 86
B. GRADES MATTER: UNIVERSITY CONTROL OVER GRADING
BEST SERVES STUDENTS' INTERESTS
Placing the ultimate responsibility for and control over
grading in the hands of the university administration, rather
than professors, guarantees universities the ability to control
their own academic missions. It also better protects the
interests of students. Combined with the minimal impact on
professors discussed above, this weighs heavily in favor of the
conclusion reached by the circuit courts, and supported by the
Supreme Court's First Amendment opinions, that grades are
ultimately the speech of the universities who issue them.
Moreover, with students as their consumers, universities are
understandably interested in protecting their interests, so that
a scheme that benefits students will likely also benefit
universities.
Students want their grades to "mean something," suggests
Dean Pedersen of Harvard.8 7 As Professor E. Edmund Reutter
observed, however, "Most discussions of... academic freedom
center on the teacher as source or purveyor of the knowledge,
ideas, and viewpoints that are to be explored, developed, and
disseminated .... The student, however, is an integral part of
the process, and 'freedom to learn' warrants attention along
with 'freedom to teach."'88
Unfortunately, not all professors exercise their grading
discretion properly in all circumstances.8 9 Professors Robert C.
85. See Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
"competition among systems of evaluation at different universities, not federal
judges, must settle the question which approach is best"), cert. denied, 533
U.S. 903 (2001); see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. See Wozniak, 236 F.3d at 891; see also Olivas, supra note 15, at 1840
(noting that "there are few cases arising from student objections to
professorial prerogatives").
87. All Things Considered, supra note 82, available at 2001 WL 9437361.
88. E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., Academic Freedom Rights of Students: Some
Recent Cases, 108 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1 (1996).
89. See Downs & Levit, supra note 79, at 825-26 (stating that random
factors such as a student's handwriting or a professor's mood can affect the
outcome of a grade). Professors Downs and Levit analyzed grade
normalization practices by surveying all American Bar Association accredited
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Downs and Nancy Levit observed that academic freedom rests
on the presumption that "professors will appropriately exercise
their responsibilities." 90 The academy, however, is not immune
from erroneous judgment; therefore, some form of
accountability is necessary to assure legitimacy to students. 91
Moreover, students receive degrees from an institution, not
from each professor from whom they took a class. When
students agree to attend a certain university, they expect to be
judged according to the university's standards. 92 A student
law schools. Id. at 821. Not surprisingly, Downs and Levit found that
different graders respond differently-in some cases, dramatically so-to the
same student's essay. Id. at 827. Moreover, they found that professors often
"fiercely defend" their own grading methods. Id. at 852. Downs and Levit
concluded, "grade normalization policies should not be thought of as
punishment for bad faculty behavior but as a normative structure to help
systematize irregularities in what is now an excessively subjective process."
Id. at 822.
Grade normalization, at least in law schools, often takes the form of
grading on a curve with a predetermined center point. Id. at 837. This
practice is not without flaws. If the administration can set the center point of
the curve, and each professor must conform his or her grades to that curve,
professors have less control over the grades they give their students. Id. at
849. Simple mathematical distribution suggests that a professor can choose to
weigh the curve heavily toward the middle, giving most students average
grades, or give many high grades and many low grades. A professor cannot
account for a particularly excellent or a particularly poor class, however, as he
or she must always give somewhat equally distributed grades. See, e.g., UNIV.
OF MINN. LAW SCH., RULES OF SCHOLASTIC REQUIREMENTS, R. 12.4 (1999),
found in UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL STUDENT HANDBOOK &
CALENDAR, 2002/2003, at 185 (2002) (on file with author) (requiring the mean
grade for each first-year class to be between 11.4 and 11.8 on a 16-point scale
and the mean grade of each upper class course with more than twenty-five
students to be between 11.5 and 12.5 on a 16-point scale).
90. Downs & Levit, supra note 79, at 851.
91. See supra note 89 (describing inappropriate grading variances
observed in law schools). This accountability need not take the form of a
purely administrative review board. In fact, a university might well prefer to
address grading issues through a committee comprised of faculty members,
rather than (or as well as) deans or other administrators. See, e.g., Keen v.
Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing the subcommittee,
comprised of five faculty members, that addressed the questionable grading of
the plaintiff).
92. Some universities may have standards that many people find
offensive, such as the status of a student's parents as donors or the student's
position on a sports team. Cf. NCAA Press Release, supra note 77,
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepage.cgi/miscellaneous/1997010801ms.htm
(noting that a student-athlete's grade point average is not the best indicator of
his or her graduation expectancy, because of the "possibility of grade inflation
and fraud due to" student-athlete status). This suggests, however, that a
professor considering joining a certain faculty or a student choosing a school
should consider the particular academic mission of the school before making a
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who enrolls in an elite private school understandably might
have dramatically different expectations of the school than
would a student who attends a community college. 93 Students
are entitled to make decisions on where to gain post-high school
education based on the academic mission of a school.94 If each
professor determined his or her own academic mission at the
expense of the university's own goals, chances of
disappointment and unfair treatment of students would
abound.
Professor Michael A. Olivas, after suggesting that
professors are entitled to a broader range of First Amendment
protection than non-professors, evaluates the implications for
students. 95  He suggests, "Any comprehensive theory of
professorial authority to determine 'how it shall be taught'
must incorporate a feedback mechanism for students to take
issue, voice complaints, and point out remarks or attitudes that
may be insensitive or disparaging."96  He then offers a
minimally satisfactory system: a professor encourages students
to come to him or her and voice concerns. 97 This suggestion
falls far short of guaranteeing fairness to students, thereby
belittling the importance of grades to them. For most students,
being able to complain to their professor would provide little
comfort and again, no assurance of ultimately receiving a fair
grade. 98
decision. A university should have the option of determining its academic
mission to be, for example, "Providing Excellent Education for Our Star
Athletes at Any Expense." Competition among the universities for professors
and students should ensure a variety of missions acceptable to the majority of
faculty and students.
93. See STUDY IN THE USA, INC., CHOOSING A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY
(2002), at http://www.studyusa.com/articles/choosing.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2002) (noting that some colleges have higher academic standards than others).
94. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PREPARING YOUR CHILD FOR COLLEGE: A
RESOURCE BOOK FOR PARENTS (2002), http://www.ed.gov/pubs/Prepare/
pt3.html (suggesting that when considering colleges, prospective students
should inquire about the philosophy of the college) (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
95. Olivas, supra note 15, at 1857.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. One suggested way to ensure fairness involves viewing a student's
relationship with his or her university as a contract between the two parties.
Schweitzer, supra note 65, at 361. Compare Hahn v. Vt. Law Sch., 698 F.2d
48, 51 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that a law school had "transacted business"
with a law student who brought a breach of contract claim against the school
and the professor who gave him an "F"), with Lyons v. Salve Regina Coll., 565
F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977) (noting that commercial contract law should not
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If a grade merely indicated students' comprehension of a
certain topic, perhaps students' interest in the fairness and
accuracy of those grades would be of less concern. Particularly
in graduate and professional programs, however, grades
represent far more than how much a student has learned.99
Grades can quickly open or shut doors. 00 That students fret
over grades can be no surprise considering the myriad ways
grades are used to differentiate between them.' 01
Ultimately, it is in the best interest of the faculty to
consider the interests of the students central to their goal of
academic freedom. 0 2 Professors can only hope to gain respect
from students if their grading practices accord with the
reasonable expectations of the students, based on their decision
to attend a particular university. 0 3 The American Association
of University Professors included in its definition of academic
freedom the assertion that a person cannot be "a successful
teacher unless he enjoys the respect of his students, and their
confidence in his intellectual integrity."10 4 Although perhaps in
general professors grade reasonably, in order to protect the
weighty interest of students in receiving fair and accurate
grades, academic institutions must be allowed to oversee
professors' grading practices. As Professors Downs and Levit
asserted, "Sweeping claims of academic freedom fall when they
run up against legitimate concerns that students are not being
treated fairly."10 5
University professors should not, under the auspices of
academic freedom, receive more First Amendment protection
than any other citizen. 106 Professors' academic freedom
interest in the grade a student ultimately receives is
be rigidly applied to the relationship between a college and a student).
99. See Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
"class rank may be vital to a student's future"); see also Marsha J. Ferziger,
All I Know About Teaching One-Ls I Learned in Sixth Grade, 3 GREEN BAG 2D
279, 280 (Spring 2000) ("In law school, academic performance in general can
have an astounding effect on a student's future.").
100. See supra note 99.
101. See id.
102. See Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Declaration of Principles (1915),
reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM & TENURE app. A, at 164 (Louis Joughin ed.,
1969).
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Downs & Levit, supra note 79, at 851.
106. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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minimal. 10 7 Competition for faculty will constrain universities
from infringing on professors' autonomy.10 8  Moreover,
consideration of the important interest in students receiving
fair grades suggests that the grade a student receives should be
treated as the speech of the university.10 9  These policy
considerations support the circuit courts' decision that grades
are the speech of the university. This Note next analyzes the
six circuit court decisions on point and the courts'
jurisprudential approaches to the issue.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' HANDLING OF
THE SPEECH VALUE OF GRADES
Grading is a "gray area" of academic freedom. 110 The
circuit court decisions in the area reflect this. The courts are
split over the relevance of the compelled speech doctrine to this
area of cases and the application of the public concern test to
professors' grading. Moreover, the courts disagree about the
extent of the academic freedom that professors enjoy. The six
opinions on grades from five circuits illustrate the confusion in
this area. The decisions fall into five broad jurisprudential
categories: (1) applying a high standard to find a violation of
academic freedom; (2) recognizing the university's academic
freedom as outweighing the professor's in the realm of
grades; 111 (3) struggling to fit the issue of grades into the public
concern doctrine; (4) applying the compelled speech doctrine;
and (5) rejecting the compelled speech doctrine.
A. TREADING LIGHTLY: "CAST[ING] A PALL OF ORTHODOXY"" 12
ANALYSIS
In Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State University, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit analyzed grades as
speech.' 13 The head of the university art department ordered a
107. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
110. Hiers, supra note 6, at 74-75 (discussing the uncertain application of
the public concern doctrine to grades).
111. Brown v. Armenti, categorized under "rejecting the compelled speech
doctrine," also ultimately reaches this conclusion. 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir.
2001).
112. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967).
113. 665 F.2d 547, 552-53 (5th Cir. 1982).
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professor to assign a certain student a "B," but the professor
chose instead to give the student "grade withheld."' 1 4 The head
of the art department then reassigned the professor to inferior
teaching positions." 15
The court first acknowledged the murkiness of the area of
academic freedom, agreeing with the professor's attorney's
description of academic freedom as "'an amorphous field about
which a great deal has been said in esoteric law journal articles
and academic publications, but little determined in explicit,
concrete judicial opinion.""'16 Academic freedom springs from
the First Amendment as it protects professors' freedom to
determine classroom content, the court stated. 1 7 In this case,
because the department head did not intend to "cast a pall of
orthodoxy" over the professor's classes, the court, quoting
Keyishian, found that the assignment of a grade was not a
teaching method and therefore not protected by the First
Amendment. 118
Hillis, decided in 1982, is the earliest of the six cases
discussed in this section. Perhaps the court's wariness of
venturing into new First Amendment territory restrained it
from delineating a clearer definition of academic freedom.
Regardless, its reliance on the language from Keyishian
brought the court full circle-after acknowledging the dearth of
"'explicit, concrete judicial opinions' in the area of academic
freedom,1 9 the court concluded its opinion without taking the
opportunity to clarify the area itself.
B. DEEMING GRADES THE SPEECH OF THE UNIVERSITY, NOT THE
PROFESSOR
The First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit reached similar
conclusions on the speech value of grades in Lovelace v.
Southeastern Massachusetts University20 and Wozniak v.
Conry,121 respectively. In Lovelace, Southeastern
Massachusetts University did not renew Matthew Lovelace's
114. Id. at 549.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 553 (quoting Hillis's attorney).
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
119. Id. (quoting Hillis's attorney).
120. 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
121. 236 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2001).
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contract to teach.122 Lovelace alleged that this was due to his
refusal to lower his teaching standards or inflate his grading
system.12 3  He claimed the university violated his First
Amendment rights when it threatened not to renew his
contract unless he acquiesced to students' complaints that the
classes he taught were too difficult and the assignments too
time-consuming.' 24  The court noted that Lovelace's First
Amendment claim was based not on his advocacy for change in
the university's grading standards, but his refusal to change
his own standards. 125  In fact, the administration had
determined that raising the grading standards in a lower-level
computer course was appropriate, in part due to Lovelace's
advice. 126 This, the court suggested, indicated "a spirit of
receptivity to faculty concens." 127
The court's holding regarding Lovelace's First Amendment
claim hinged on the university's right to establish and maintain
its own educational mission: "Whether a school sets itself up to
attract and serve only the best and the brightest students or
whether it instead gears its standard to a broader, more
average population is a policy decision which, we think,
universities must be allowed to set."128 Therefore, grading
policies, as well as homework load and course content, are
matters in which the university necessarily is concerned. 129 If
each professor's grading standards were protected and beyond
the reach of the administration of a university, the university's
ability to define itself would be hindered. 130
According to the First Circuit, "The [Flirst [A]mendment
does not require that each nontenured professor be made a
sovereign unto himself."131 The court thus found Lovelace's
claim that his grading standards did in fact conform to
university standards to be a determination for the university,
not the judiciary, to make. 32
122. 793 F.2d at 421.
123. Id. at 425.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 425-26.
129. Id. at 426 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
312 (1978)).
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 426 n.2.
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In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed the speech value of grades in much the same way as
the Lovelace court did. 133 In Wozniak v. Conry, a professor at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign violated the
school's grading policy by refusing to turn in the materials he
used to determine students' grades at the end of the
semester. 134 Wozniak maintained his title and corresponding
salary but asserted that the dean impeded his research and did
not allow him to teach any further classes. 135
Although Wozniak's First Amendment argument came in
the form of a claim regarding students' rights, rather than his
own right to academic free speech, 136 Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the court, commented on the interrelationship
between a university and its professors.1 37 The court noted that
other universities give professors more discretion regarding
grades than the University of Illinois had in this instance, and
even acknowledged that more discretion might be preferable. 138
The court emphasized, however, that schools, rather than
courts, must determine which system is in fact better: 39 each
university can "decide for itself how the authority to assign
grades is allocated within its faculty."1 40 This process, the court
suggested, leads to competition between schools for the best
faculty.
The court viewed the grade a student receives as a
message from the university, not the individual professor. 14'
The court noted that, "It is the University's name, not
Wozniak's, that appears on the diploma; the University, not
Wozniak, certifies to employers and graduate schools a
student's successful completion of a course of study."142
Moreover, the court noted that professorial autonomy in
grading does not best serve the interests of students: "By
insisting on a right to grade as he pleases, Wozniak devalues
his students' right to grades that accurately reflect their
133. See Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001).
134. Id. at 889.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 891.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
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achievements." 143 The view of grades as a mode of expression
for professors, the court suggested, undermines the importance
of the objectivity of grades for students. 144 As theLovelace
court had, the Wozniak court focused on allowing educational
institutions the latitude to determine their own educational
mission and deemed grades to be the speech of the
university. 145
C. EMBRACING THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
In 1989, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
faced the issue of grades as speech in Parate v. Isibor.146
Tennessee State University did not renew a nontenured
professor's contract after an extended conflict that stemmed
from disagreement over a student's grade. 147 Parate at first
refused to change a student's grade at the request of the
administration. 148 After being pressed, however, he did change
the grade, making a notation on the grade-change form
signifying his disagreement. 49 The university refused to allow
him to indicate his disapproval in any way. 150  The
administration subjected Parate to intensely critical and
abusive treatment over the rest of the year and did not renew
his contract. 151
The court found that by forcing Parate to change the grade
himself rather than changing the grade administratively, the
university unconstitutionally compelled Parate's speech in a
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989).
147. Id. at 823-25.
148. Id. at 824. Parate gave a "B" to a student who had cheated on the
final examination and given incredible, and in some circumstances, clearly
falsified, medical excuses. Id. Parate explained his grading practice in detail
at the beginning of the semester, and willingly changed a different student's
grade when the other student provided credible explanations for a downward
trend in test performance. Id.
149. Id. Parate made two attempts to indicate his disapproval of the grade.
He first noted on the grade-change form that the change was "per instructions
from Dean and Department Head at meeting," and, when that was rejected, he
altered his signature in protest. Id. at 823-24. University administrators
rejected both efforts. Id. at 824.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 824-25. For example, the department head berated Parate's
teaching ability in front of his students. Id. at 825.
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manner that was "unduly burdensome." 152 By not allowing him
to express his disagreement with the grade, the court held, the
university "compelled Parate to conform to a belief and a
communication to which he did not subscribe." 153 Parate's
definition of the right of professors is not a strong assertion of a
broad right; the court held that "[b]ecause the assignment of a
letter grade is symbolic communication intended to send a
specific message to the student, the individual professor's
communicative act is entitled to some measure of First
Amendment protection."' 54  The court was careful to
distinguish this case from one in which a university is working
to control its own educational mission, noting that Tennessee
State "did not try to alter Parate's pedagogical style, but
compelled his speech."155 The court thereby suggested that a
university's ability to dictate the educational mission of its
institution remains intact.156
D. WRESTLING WITH THE PUBLIC CONCERN TEST
In 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered academic freedom in the context of a bizarre
professor-student interaction in Keen v. Penson.157 A student
enrolled in a class taught by Keen criticized some aspects of the
class, including spot quizzes and a book report that was
deemed optional in the syllabus, yet accounted for ten percent
of each student's overall grade in the course. 158 Keen took
offense to this criticism and believed it created a negative
classroom atmosphere. 159  Their disagreement intensified,
resulting in Keen refusing to issue a grade until the student
adequately apologized to him and the class. 160 Keen eventually
gave the student, who repeatedly tried to satisfy his
152. Id. at 830.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 827 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 830.
156. See id.
157. 970 F.2d 252, 257-59 (7th Cir. 1992).
158. Id. at 253.
159. Id.
160. Id. The student and Keen met once and scheduled a second
conference. Id. The student did not attend the second conference because she
had returned to Keen's office after the first meeting and before the scheduled
second, and therefore thought that the second meeting was no longer
necessary or expected. Id.
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requirements via extensive correspondence, an "F."161
The court found that it was "difficult to see what matters of
public concern are implicated.., by the 'F' grade [Keen]
eventually gave" the student. 162 Even if the First Amendment
applied, the court stated it would engage in a balancing test
between Keen's First Amendment right and the university's
interest in fair grades for its students. 63 The Seventh Circuit
quoted the Sixth Circuit's suggestion in Parate that "'the
individual professor may not be compelled, by university
officials, to change a grade that the professor previously
assigned to her student,"' 64 but emphasized that it "express [ed]
neither approval nor disapproval of the Sixth Circuit's
somewhat broad statement."' 65 Ultimately, the Keen court
concluded, "The First Amendment does not shield Keen's
conduct from sanctions."166
E. REJECTING PARATE'S COMPELLED SPEECH ANALYSIS
Brown v. Armenti is the most recent circuit court decision
dealing with professors' interest in the grades they assign to
students.' 67 Brown refused to change a student's grade from an
"F" to an "Incomplete" at the request of the president of the
university and later was terminated. 168 The court addressed
whether the university violated Brown's First Amendment
rights, 169 noting that "the Supreme Court has held that the
161. Id. Keen's role in the communication included calling the student's
criticisms "hit-and-run accusations," sending one letter that included a list of
twenty facts regarding the class, fourteen comments about the student, and
twenty-six questions for her to address, suggesting that she would not be a
good candidate for a teacher, her career goal, and referring to her efforts at
apologizing as "unscholarly" and "objectionable." Id. at 260-62. The Seventh
Circuit found that the full force of the inappropriateness of the communication
could not be evoked without reprinting much of the letters, and it did so in an
appendix to its opinion. Id. at 253, 259-62. Reviewing university faculty
members deemed Keen's communication to Johnson at least unprofessional
and, according to some reviewers, inappropriate. Id. at 254-56.
162. Id. at 257.
163. Id. at 257-58.
164. Id. at 258 (quoting Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 1989)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 247 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2001); see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
168. Armenti, 247 F.3d at 72.
169. Id. Defendant Armenti argued that he was entitled to the defense of
qualified immunity, which applies only if, among other requirements, no
constitutional rights have been violated. Id. Therefore, the court had to delve
into First Amendment analysis before reaching this determination. Id.
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university setting is one in which First Amendment free speech
protections ... are of particular importance." 170 The Armenti
court, however, emphasized that there are limits on free speech
in universities. 171  Moreover, the court made a distinction
between professors' rights inside and outside of the
classroom. 172  Inside the classroom, the university's own
academic freedom must be considered. 173 The court found that
"[b]ecause grading is pedagogic, the assignment of the grade is
subsumed under the university's freedom to determine how a
course is to be taught."174 The court therefore concluded that
Brown did not have a First Amendment right "to expression via
the school's grade assignment procedure."1 75 The Armenti court
agreed with the Lovelace and Wozniak courts on this point.176
Although the Armenti court cited Parate v. Isibor, it did not
elaborate on Parate's implications for Armenti. ' 77 Rather, it
simply stated the facts and holding of Parate before declining to
follow it, noting instead that an earlier Third Circuit case
"applies to the present case and offers a more realistic view of
the university-professor relationship."' 78
The court seemed concerned with the idea of the judiciary
entering into the field of student evaluation and second-
guessing the determinations of the university.179 It observed
that "[w]hether the school registrar is told that a student's
performance rates an 'F' or an 'Incomplete' is not a matter that
warrants the 'intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name
of the First Amendment."" 80 Therefore, the court deferred to
the university's evaluation of Brown's grading. '81
170. Id. at 74.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 75.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 120-145 and accompanying text.
177. Armenti, 247 F.3d at 75.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). The court
proceeded to analyze Brown's claim regarding retaliation to his critical
evaluation of Armenti, finding that the evaluation was not of public concern,
therefore not entitled to constitutional protection. Id. at 79.
181. Id.
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IV. UNRAVELING THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE AND
FASHIONING A MORE WORKABLE SCHEME
The circuit court decisions leave several issues unresolved.
How the matter of public concern doctrine relates to the
analysis of professors' speech interest in grades is confused.
Furthermore, the circuits are split over whether the compelled
speech doctrine applies when university administration
requires a professor to change a grade. This Part analyzes the
current jurisprudence in the area and suggests the following
approach to the topic.
First, courts must consider the compelled speech doctrine,
as the Parate court did. University administrators should not
be allowed to force professors to speak in a particular way by
compelling them to give a grade with which they disagree.
Second, the grading system of a public university is a matter of
public concern, and if a professor-or any other citizen-
chooses to criticize it, that speech should be protected under the
First Amendment. The courts, however, should stop wrestling
with the public concern test in cases such as those described in
Part III and recognize that the grade that one professor gives
one student does not represent that professor commenting on a
matter of public concern. Clarifying the use of these two
doctrines in cases arising from a grade dispute would resolve
much of the confusion about the First Amendment implications
of public university professors' grading.
A. A CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION: THE COMPELLED SPEECH
DOCTRINE
The Seventh and the Third Circuits, addressing the issue
after Parate, offered a cautious "no comment" to Parate's
compelled speech discussion and rejected the Parate analysis,
respectively. 182 The issue of compelled speech, however, as
addressed in Parate, must play a role in an analysis of the
proper treatment of professors' grades. If a university
administration disagrees with the grade assigned by a
professor, it is then faced with resolving the matter, by either
accepting the grade the professor has given, forcing the
professor to change the grade, changing the grade itself, or
changing the grade and acknowledging the professor's
disagreement with, for example, a notation on the grade report
182. See supra notes 164-165, 177-78 and accompanying text.
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or transcript.183
Parate v. Isibor is the only circuit court decision addressing
a professor's First Amendment interest in grades that adopts
the compelled speech doctrine. 18 4 This is likely due to the
extreme circumstances in that case-the university clearly
mistreated the professor. 8 5 In no other case was a court
confronted with the situation of a university forcing a professor
to change the grade in such a way as to disallow the professor
to express his disagreement with the grade. 186
Because the Armenti court did not face a university
exercising such strong control over one of its professors, it did
not have to address the relevance of the compelled speech
doctrine to the issue of professors' First Amendment interest in
the grades they assign students. 187 As it declined to follow
Parate, however, the Armenti court suggested that it doubted
the relevance of that doctrine. 88 In fact, the Armenti court
asserted that Parate represented an unrealistic view of the
relationship between a professor and a university. 189
The Parate court's determination that in the grade he or
she gives a student, a professor should have "some measure of'
protection under the First Amendment is not a ringing
endorsement of a strong right inhering in professors.190 As one
commentator noted, "Parate does carve out a new niche in the
area of constitutional protections for professors, but does little
to extend substantive constitutional law or to predict future
constitutional protections."' 9' Parate is a necessary but
tentative step toward recognizing that professors have some
speech interest in the grades they give their students.
Applying Parate's compelled speech approach to the realm
of grading is essential. If grades are the university's speech,
rather than the professor's, as suggested by the circuit court
decisions, the university ultimately should be willing to present
itself as the speaker. Of course, in the vast majority of cases,
183. This Note subsequently uses "transcript" to refer to all means by
which a university communicates a student's grades.
184. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
191. Dumas et al., supra note 15, at 728.
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university administrations will accept without question the
grading of its professors, so the speech of the two will be one
and the same. In essence, then, the university will have
allowed the professor to speak on its behalf. In extraordinary
cases like Parate, where the university rejects the speech of the
professor, however, the university must allow for the
divergence in the speech of the professor and itself. As Wooley
v. Maynard and West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette established, the right to refrain from speaking is as
important as the right to speak. 192  In these cases, the
university should issue the grade itself and neither force the
professor to give the grade nor require the professor to affirm
the grade.
Grading on a curve raises another issue of compelled
speech. The ability of the administration to set the center point
of the curve is problematic. 193 Universities that choose to set
their center point particularly high, requiring a professor to
give nearly half the class at least an "A-," for example, thereby
force those professors who do not believe that half the class
deserves an "A" to misrepresent their evaluation of the
students in their class. 194 In these situations, along with those
in which the university changes the grade given by the
professor, professors should be able to elect not to have their
name appear on the transcript next to the grade.
In most circumstances, a student's transcript lists a grade
after the names of the course and the instructor. Therefore, on
the rare occasion when a university and a professor overtly
disagree, a special notation on the transcript may be
appropriate. Students understandably might object to a
lengthy explanation that would draw the curious attention of
potential employers or graduate school admission committees.
For this reason, the most appropriate notation may simply be
replacing the professor's name with "University" or
"Administration." It is possible that a student might protest
even a subtle notation such as this, but this argument falls
short when considered alongside professors' important interest
192. See supra Part I.C.
193. See All Things Considered, supra note 82, available at 2001 WL
9437361.
194. See id. (explaining that ninety percent of Harvard University's 2001
undergraduate graduating class received honors, and about half of the
students generally receive "A"s).
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in not being compelled to speak in a certain fashion. 95
Moreover, a student would probably choose to suffer the
notation if he or she received a higher grade from the
administration than from the professor, which, if the circuit
cases accurately represent the phenomenon, is the more
common occurrence.
1 96
B. DIFFICULT TO SEE: THE (IR)RELEVANCE OF THE PUBLIC
CONCERN TEST TO THE DISCUSSION OF GRADES AS SPEECH
The circuits are split over whether the analysis of grades
as speech must fit into the framework of the public concern
test. 197 The Armenti court, for example, did not use the test as
a framework to analyze whether Brown's grade had First
Amendment protection. 198 It did, however, use it in analyzing
one of Brown's other claims, 199 which suggests that the court
deemed the public concern test irrelevant to a determination of
whether Brown's grades were protected by the First
Amendment. The only circuit that has struggled to apply the
public concern test in this context is the Seventh Circuit, in
Keen v. Penson.200 The court wrote that "[i]t is difficult to see
what matters of public concern are implicated.., by the 'F'
grade [the professor] eventually gave" the student.201 It then
proceeded to suggest that the balancing process that would
determine whether the interests of the teacher outweighed the
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
196. See Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
professor gave an "F" and the administration ordered it changed to an
"Incomplete"); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 253, 255 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that the professor gave an "F" and the administration ordered it changed to a
"C"); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 824 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that the
professor gave a "B" and the administration ordered it changed to an "A");
Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982)
(noting that the professor gave a "grade withheld" and the administration
gave a "B").
197. See Hiers, supra note 6, at 77 ("Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Circuit
opinions considered whether the speech in question addressed a matter of
public concern."); compare Keen, 970 F.2d at 257-58 (applying the public
concern doctrine to a case involving grades), with Armenti, 247 F.3d at 75-76
(declining to apply the public concern doctrine), and Wozniak v. Conry, 236
F.3d 888, 889-91 (7th Cir. 2001) (same), and Parate, 868 F.2d at 826-31
(same), and Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 425-26 (1st
Cir. 1986) (same), and Hillis, 665 F.2d at 552-53 (same).
198. See supra Part III.E.
199. See supra note 180.
200. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
201. Keen. 970 F.2d at 257.
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interests of the university would come out in favor of the
university.202
The Seventh Circuit's admitted difficulty in analyzing
grading through the auspices of the public concern test is
understandable. The balancing test from Pickering v. Board of
Education commands a court analyzing the First Amendment
protection of a state employee "to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." 2 3  In the context of a
professor and his or her university employer's disagreement
about a student's grade, the professor's interest is difficult to
quantify while the state's is fairly easy to see. The interest of
the state in "promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs"20 4 is ensuring that students receive grades that
accurately represent their performance; the university desires
to produce students who have fulfilled its academic
requirements, as the university defines them to be. Moreover,
Rankin v. McPherson clarified that the state interest half of the
balancing test focuses on public employers' ability to manage
their operations.20 5 In order for universities to achieve their
educational mission, they must maintain ultimate control over
the grades their students receive.
Unlike the university's interest in this context, the
professor's interest is difficult to articulate. Pickering requires
a determination of the teacher's interest "in commenting upon
matters of public concern."20 6 The professor's assignment of a
grade to a student should not be a comment on anything other
than the student's performance, and even if it is an effort to
convey a broader message, it should not be acknowledged as
anything other than that.20 7 Moreover, this is not the type of
situation the Supreme Court considered when it articulated the
balancing test for analyzing First Amendment protection in
Pickering.20 8 The teacher in Pickering spoke out about an issue
202. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
203. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
206. 391 U.S. at 568.
207. Cf. Keen, 970 F.2d at 259 (observing that "a professor could properly
be disciplined for assigning grades on the basis of hair color").
208. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
2003]
844 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:813
that, while connected to the school and, thereby, his
employment, might concern a citizen regardless of his or her
employment. 209
If a public university professor criticizes the university's
overall grading policy, that speech would be protected. 210 The
facts of the six cases discussed in Part III do not suggest,
however, that the professors intended to express an overall
critique of the university grading policy via student grades.
211
This is a critical distinction: A professor's criticism of the
grading practices of the university is a comment on a matter of
public concern; a professor's grade that clashes with the
grading practices of the university is not a comment on a
matter of public concern. 212 The confusion expressed in Keen
may stem from the fact that those professors whose grades the
administration questions are often the same professors who
criticize the grading practices of the university.21 3  Future
courts addressing a professor's First Amendment interest in
the grades he or she has given, however, need not engage in the
Pickering balancing process. 214 A university that disagrees
with a professor's grade is not "silenc[ing] discourse" but
209. See id.
210. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Lindsey v. Bd. of
Regents, 607 F.2d 672, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that an assistant
professor's distribution of a questionnaire to the faculty regarding the
university administration was protected speech).
211. See supra Part III.
212. See Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 79 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Had the
plaintiff been reprimanded for speaking regarding, for example, grade
inflation, a specific subject about which there is demonstrated interest, he
might have satisfied this [public concern] test."); Eisen v. Temple Univ., No.
CIV.A. 01-4165, 2002 WL 1565331, at *1 (E.D. Pa., July 9, 2002) (finding that
the plaintiff professor's speech regarding alleged grade inflation and academic
fraud was arguably protected); see also William G. Buss, Academic Freedom
and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 213, 239 (1999) ("Applying the Pickering-Connick test to the teacher in
the classroom as the communicator of a curriculum to students is a classic
example of trying to use a tool designed for one purpose in the performance of
an entirely different task-and one for which it is not suited.").
213. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text (explaining that the
professor in Lovlace v. Southeastern Massachusetts University, 793 F.2d 419,
426 (1st Cir. 1986), advocated for change in the university's grading policy).
214. Of course, in cases such as Lovelace, where a professor not only
disagrees with the administration about the grade given to a particular
student, but also criticizes the overall university grading policy, the public
concern test would be pertinent in the court's analysis of the professor's
criticism of the broader policy. See supra notes 36, 125-126 and accompanying
text..
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controlling its academic mission. 215
Professor Richard H. Hiers notes, "At this point in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, it remains uncertain how the
Court's lines of academic freedom and general public employee
speech case law will intersect."216 The irrelevance of the public
concern test to cases involving professors' assignment of grades
suggests that it is inappropriate for academic freedom and
general public employee speech law to intersect at this
particular point, regardless of its possible interrelatedness with
other areas of academic freedom.217
CONCLUSION
The grade that a student receives in a class is the speech of
the university that he or she has chosen to attend, rather than
the speech of the professor from whom he or she took a class.
The circuit courts essentially reach the same conclusion on this
point from the First Amendment case law, and policy rationales
advocate this result as well. Universities have a strong interest
in the grades their students receive and should have the right
to control the academic mission of the institution. The grade a
professor gives a student is not a statement on a matter of
public concern, and therefore courts need not wrestle with that
test's confused application to these cases. Professors have a
First Amendment interest in the grades they assign to
students; their interest extends to protection from being
compelled to give a grade that they do not believe is
appropriate. In order to protect this interest, universities
should be willing to make a notation on a student's transcript
that reflects this. Finally, students' interest in the grades they
receive is tremendous, and they should be afforded the ability
to choose a university based on its academic philosophy.
Justice Stevens described academic freedom as
"thriv[ing] ... on the independent and uninhibited exchange of
ideas among teachers and students."218 Academic freedom is
215. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
216. Hiers, supra note 60, at 277.
217. Compare Hoofnagle, supra note 32, at 669 ("The 'matter of public
concern' test .... is now used to determine the First Amendment value of
professors' expression. . . ."), with Hiers, supra note 6, at 106 (suggesting a
rejection of the doctrine as it relates to academic free speech, deeming it
'entirely out of place in academe").
218. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985).
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central to the American idea of higher education. 219 The
university's ability to determine the grades its students receive,
however, does not inhibit the exchange of ideas that is the
essence of professorial academic freedom. Clarifying the
relevance of key First Amendment doctrines will help refine
academic freedom jurisprudence and bring more definition to a
murky area. Placing the ultimate control over a student's
grades in the hands of the institution rather than each
individual professor removes little from the professor and
promises much to the student.
219. See id.
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